Save the INF Treaty–but not by repeating history

September 14, 2017

Thomas Graham, Jr. (Special Representative of the President for Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament, 1994-1997)

Bernadette Stadler (Herbert Scoville Jr. Peace Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation)

Cross posted from the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

—-

In 1983, the United States began deploying ground-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe. The deployment caused the Soviets to walk out of ongoing arms control negotiations. But it also led to the negotiation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and the elimination of an entire class of missiles from the arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union.

Thirty-odd years later, as the United States contends with a Russian violation of the INF treaty, some experts and policy makers have urged Washington to develop its own treaty-violating missile and to help allies—who are not bound by the treaty—acquire the new missile. Indeed, Congress is currently considering legislation calling for the United States to develop a program of record for a missile that, if tested, would violate the treaty. But even if the United States retraced all the steps it took during the initial INF Treaty negotiations—including the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe—it could not recreate the underlying conditions that allowed the negotiations to succeed in the first place. Only a clear understanding of today’s underlying conditions can shape an effective response to Moscow’s treaty violation.

How it happened. In the late 1970s, the Soviet Union deployed in Europe an accurate, road-mobile, intermediate-range ballistic missile equipped with multiple independently targetable warheads. The missile, known as the SS-20, sparked concern within NATO. The SS-20 system appeared to be a nuclear war–fighting weapon, as opposed to a weapon of deterrence, and was regarded as a huge threat to the alliance.

In 1979, NATO responded with a “double-track” strategy, which entailed engaging the Soviet Union in negotiations on theater nuclear forces while simultaneously preparing to deploy US intermediate-range missiles in Europe if negotiations failed. Though the US missiles that were eventually deployed are often perceived solely as a response to the deployment of the SS-20, they were also intended to reassure NATO allies concerned that arms control treaties, including a new Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), would weaken US extended deterrence.

The US-Soviet negotiations that ultimately resulted in the INF Treaty began in 1980, but neither side seemed to take the talks particularly seriously. Rather, NATO’s European members were the driving force behind the negotiations. Though they never had a seat at the bargaining table, European NATO members knew they faced an uphill battle in persuading their citizens to accept US missiles if diplomacy failed—and therefore they wished to see it succeed. The United States had less skin in the game and might have let the negotiations languish without NATO pressure. On the Soviet side, General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev was not willing to accept limitations on his nation’s very large force of intermediate-range missiles. And the Soviets were optimistic that public opposition to US missiles in Europe might prevent their deployment.

In 1981, Ronald Reagan inherited the INF negotiations and announced an ambitious new vision for the talks: the “zero option,” under which the United States would deploy no intermediate-range missiles in Europe if the Soviet Union eliminated its own intermediate-range missiles. Brezhnev rejected this proposal as one-sided because it would require the Soviet Union to dismantle existing weapons while the United States would only have to forgo deploying new ones. In 1983, with no progress achieved on the diplomatic track, the United States began deploying Tomahawk cruise missiles and Pershing II ballistic missiles in Europe. In response, the Soviets walked out of the negotiations—which only resumed in early 1985.

Shortly after the negotiations restarted, Mikhail Gorbachev came to power. In contrast to his predecessors, who attempted to achieve foreign policy objectives by increasing Soviet military might, Gorbachev believed that security could be based on political measures, including arms control. Under Gorbachev, the Soviet military’s influence over foreign policy weakened, and the Politburo even re-evaluated the SS-20 and concluded that it was militarily irrelevant. Under Gorbachev, the INF negotiations gained pace.

In 1986, Reagan and Gorbachev met in Reykjavik to discuss arms control. The leaders made remarkable progress—almost finalizing an agreement that would have, in principle, eliminated all nuclear weapons. Though they were unable to achieve this lofty goal, they built momentum for the INF talks, which concluded with the signing of the treaty in December 1987.

What’s different now. The INF Treaty was the product of a specific moment in history, and its successful negotiation depended on a number of conditions that do not pertain today. First, NATO countries played an important role in influencing US actions during the negotiations. Members of the alliance, West Germany in particular, pushed the United States to deploy missiles in Europe to solidify US extended deterrence and counter the Soviet threat. European leaders pushed for deployment even though they faced enormous pressure from politicians at home who opposed the introduction of missiles into Europe, as well as from the public, which was deeply antinuclear.

Today, NATO countries seem ambivalent about Russia’s INF violation. The United States, in order to protect sources and methods, has thus far been unable to share with its NATO allies in-depth information about the violation. Some allies have been reluctant to confront Russia until they see more evidence.

Even if they possessed all the information, members of the alliance would be reluctant to accept new nuclear weapons systems on their territory. Five NATO states—Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Norway, and Luxembourg—have previously called for the United States to remove from Europe its approximately 150 to 200 tactical nuclear weapons. Some observers have speculated that NATO’s newest members might accept US missiles on their territory, but since NATO decisions are made by consensus, the whole alliance would have to support the decision to deploy missiles.

Furthermore, negotiations toward the INF Treaty succeeded in part because of the personal characteristics of Soviet and US leaders at the time. Unlike his predecessors, Gorbachev favored an improved relationship with the West and believed that arms control negotiations could contribute to Soviet security. Gorbachev and Reagan also seemed to hold nuclear weapons in a different regard than did other Cold Warriors. Reagan famously pronounced that “[A] nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” Gorbachev called for the “complete elimination of nuclear weapons.” Although some dismiss these stances as political posturing, the attempts by Reagan and Gorbachev to rid the world of nuclear weapons at Reykjavik demonstrated their commitment to disarmament.

US and Russian leaders today are substantially different from Reagan and Gorbachev. President Donald Trump has professed to want better relations with Russia, but he has also been the subject of intensive investigation into potential collusion with Russia during his presidential campaign. His independence in dealing with Russia has been further stymied by anti-Russia sentiment in Congress, which recently passed sanctions against Moscow. While President Vladimir Putin appears to have a positive personal relationship with Trump, he thrives on competition with the United States and may count on it for political survival. Furthermore, neither Trump nor Putin has expressed any particular affinity for arms control.

What to do. Conditions have changed since the INF Treaty was negotiated, but saving the treaty and preventing a new SS-20–like threat to Europe are not impossible. The United States, in order to bring Russia back into compliance, will have to adopt strategies that are specifically tailored to the conditions that exist today—conditions that include possible NATO reluctance to host new nuclear-capable weapons systems and Putin’s aggressive approach to foreign affairs.

One possible approach involves capitalizing on Russia’s refusal to admit that it is in violation of the treaty, despite its having been presented with evidence of the infraction—and Moscow’s preference, if the treaty is indeed to fail, that blame land on the United States. Unfortunately, that is precisely where blame would land if Washington were to develop an intermediate-range missile system that, if tested and deployed, would violate the treaty. If, on the other hand, the United States shared with its allies indisputable evidence of Russia’s violation, pressure on Moscow to come back into compliance would mount. In addition to publicizing Russia’s violation, the United States should also offer Russia a way to save face and return to compliance without having to admit a violation.

If the time ever comes for the United States to remind Russia just how much it hated the deployment of US missiles in Europe, it could do so without violating the INF Treaty. Steven Pifer, a non-resident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, has suggested that the United States could deploy additional conventional air- and sea-launched cruise missiles to Europe. These systems exhibit several advantages: They would not violate the INF Treaty, which only covers ground-based systems; they are already in the US arsenal; and they would be easy to remove if Russia returned to compliance.

The original negotiations toward the INF Treaty offer valuable lessons about handling Russia’s violation of the agreement—but simply matching Russia’s violation with a new violation is not a viable solution. Negotiations succeed and fail for a number of complex reasons, including who is in power, who is at the table, and how the international community views (and whether it supports) the negotiations. To save the INF Treaty, the United States must develop strategies that both acknowledge—and take advantage of—circumstances that exist today.

Advertisements

The U.S. Should Take a Lesson from Hungary

September 7, 2017

April H. Foley (U.S. Ambassador to Hungary, 2006-2009)

This Letter to the Editor originally appeared in

The Wall Street Journal

—–

The US should take a lesson from Hungary when it comes to unwanted statues. After the fall of communism, Hungarians were angrily destroying Soviet statues. The government wisely decided to move them all to a museum/park called Memento Park. Students of history can now visit these haunting symbols of fallen communism and a most despised era and value system.

Tea Leaves: Progress on the Bumpy Road to Democracy

September 1, 2017

Curtis S. Chin (U.S. Ambassador to the Asian Development Bank, 2007-2010; Asia Fellow, Milken Institute)

Cross posted from the Nikkei Asian Review

—–

A decade ago, I traveled to East Timor, also known as Timor-Leste, to look at the condition of roads and other infrastructure in Asia’s newest country. I was working with the Asian Development Bank at the time, and returned in 2010 for a follow-up visit. It was not until July this year that I returned again — this time as an independent election observer, to witness firsthand the country’s ongoing journey to democracy.

Just like the country’s roads, that voyage remains a work in progress, undoubtedly with more bumps and twists along the way. But in a world awash with cynicism, and with democracy under pressure in so many countries, I found hope in this young nation of some 1.2 million people.

The parliamentary election that I observed and a presidential poll held in March were the first run without international assistance since a United Nations mission left in 2012. A Portuguese colony for 273 years until 1975, East Timor was forcibly occupied by neighboring Indonesia until 1999, and regained its independence only in 2002 after a transition administered by the U.N.

My election day began before dawn, to the sound of roosters, in the small mountain town of Ainaro, where I stayed in a guesthouse a short walk from a beautiful colonial church. For most of the day, with my interpreter Arianto, our driver Angelo and a smartphone app that showed polling stations, I traveled on roads good and bad, and crossed rivers on bridges new and old, throughout the region.

Ainaro district, some 4-5 hours’ drive from the capital Dili, is a special place. Here, Xanana Gusmao, who would become the first president of East Timor, spent many years directing resistance to Indonesian occupation. During World War II, Ainaro was where Imperial Japan’s efforts to conquer this region came to an end.

In contrast to the mayhem and violence back then, the scenes I saw were festive and peaceful. Voters waited quietly at polling stations that opened promptly at 7 a.m. Until the polls closed early afternoon I saw voters coming on foot, by motorcycle and by bus or truck to cast their votes. Young or old, each showed a voter identification card, had his or her name confirmed on voter rolls and entered an election booth to mark a choice from some 21 political parties. A nail was provided to punch a hole in the ballot. Afterward, each voter dipped an index finger into a well of indelible ink to help prevent double voting.

Weeks later, national pride in what happened on that sunny Saturday election day can still be sensed, even as political parties jockey for position in the formation of a new government. “Once again, we have shown the world that Timor-Leste is a democratic country,” my interpreter, and now friend, Arianto Martins de Jesus told me. “The election has brought new hope for Timor-Leste’s people, no matter who leads the government.”

As with all governments — democratically elected or not — a key challenge will be delivering on people’s hopes. Running an election can be the easy part, in contrast to forming a government and running a country. But hope there is, even if at first glance East Timor is struggling on several fronts. Poverty remains high, as does youth unemployment. Oil and gas reserves, the government’s primary source of revenue, could well be depleted by 2022.

Yet notable strides have been made in the last decade to improve living conditions and increase economic opportunities. The Dili I visited in July is a far cry from the one I first saw a decade ago. Plans for East Timor’s first internationally branded hotel, a Hilton, have just been announced, and the international franchises Burger King and Gloria Jean’s Coffees are already in Dili. The infant mortality rate has almost halved since East Timor regained independence, and malaria cases have declined dramatically. Although not all in the region yet agree, East Timor’s accession to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations is richly deserved, and would help to lock in progress.

Before making the long road trip back to the capital after election day, I stopped in the old church in Ainaro and caught the start of Sunday service. Much was in the local language, but now and then I heard the word “Alleluia.” Praise and celebration were certainly in order. There may be challenging times ahead for East Timor, but the country’s commitment to the rule of law, peace and democracy bodes well for its future. This tiny young nation is an example to much larger neighbors which are still struggling, or even stalling, on their own bumpy paths to democracy.

NAFTA 2.0: Let the ‘Games’ Begin

August 25, 2017

Antonio O. Garza (U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, 2002-2009)

Cross posted from Ambassador Garza’s website

—–

The NAFTA talks kicked off this past week in Washington DC, with negotiators from the three countries outlining their visions for improving trilateral trade. While the mood appeared to be generally constructive, tensions surfaced as U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer repeated the Trump administration’s focus on reducing trade deficits. The negotiators will sit down next in Mexico City on September 1st to continue hashing out the details on this point and others, but even if they can successfully produce a NAFTA 2.0 by early next year they may still face the biggest challenge of all. As I wrote about for Texas Monthly, the toughest part of redesigning NAFTA may not be determining the agreement’s content but managing the political risk both during and after the process.

With the 23-year old NAFTA in a vulnerable position, it’s worth taking a step back and remembering what is at stake. While far from perfect, the trade agreement guides the cross-border exchange of billions of dollars in agricultural products, motor vehicles, and appliances. It underpins millions of jobs from California to Kansas to Maine, and is the framework for entire industries’ business models. If NAFTA suddenly disappears, it would be impossible for the three region’s economies to exit unscathed. The disruptions that come from businesses’ reshuffling their operations and absorbing higher costs would cause some to shut down and others to pass along the costs to consumers through higher prices. There are ways to gradually adjust the agreement to make it work better for all parties, but this requires using proverbial scalpels to adjust, finesse, and stabilize the agreement, rather than a hammer to smash the parts that aren’t working quite right.

Yet in Mexico, the NAFTA talks are only one of the big news stories, as the country is already beginning its 2018 presidential and congressional election preparations. While the campaigns don’t kick off until next year, Mexico’s National Electoral Institute and Congress have allocated funding for political parties (unlike the United States, Mexico uses public funds for campaign financing), capping off campaign financing at the highest levels ever. There is a general sense that Ándres Manuel López Obrador is the frontrunner, but the jockeying among presidential hopefuls in the PRI and PAN parties is just beginning. For those reading the political tea leaves, changes in President Enrique Peña Nieto’s PRI will now allow individuals from outside the party to become a presidential candidate, in a move that would appear to favor the current Finance Minister Jose Antonio Meade. But with just under a year to go and a deep bench of contenders, there surely will be many twists and turns to come.

For those of you in South Texas or interested in local border issues, it’s worth tuning in to two upcoming construction projects. The first project is for a section of border wall that will cut straight through cross-border Santa Ana Wildlife Reserve and the second are LNG export terminals set to be constructed in the Port of Brownsville. These projects raise significant economic and environmental issues, and unfortunately—as I write about here—local residents’ voices and concerns have so far been given short shrift.

Why Timor-Leste Deserves to Join ASEAN

August 23, 2017

Curtis S. Chin (U.S. Ambassador to the Asian Development Bank, 2007-2010; Asia Fellow, Milken Institute)

Cross-posted from The Japan Times

—–

Fifty years since its establishment, it is time for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations to welcome another member into its midst—with Japan’s support.

The recent meeting of Southeast Asian foreign ministers in the Philippines drew more attention than usual to its concluding communique. More so than in past versions, this year’s ASEAN concluding joint statement made clear the grouping of 10 nations’ hopes for a demilitarized South China Sea. In one paragraph, the communique also noted “the importance of maintaining and promoting peace, security, safety and freedom of navigation in and over-flight above the South China Sea.” While not explicitly named, China was very clearly the focus of attention.

Garnering much less attention was the single paragraph that “noted Timor-Leste’s application for ASEAN membership and looked forward to the continued discussion” about reports and capacity building regarding that small Southeast Asian island nation’s longstanding efforts to join the regional bloc.

That’s unfortunate. ASEAN should welcome the accession of Timor-Leste, just as Laos and Myanmar were welcomed in 1997, and Cambodia in 1999.

I had the privilege of serving as an election monitor for Timor-Leste’s recent parliamentary election as part of the International Republican Institute’s (IRI) election observation mission. I was struck by the passionate commitment of the Timorese people to the democratic process, and inspired by their optimism about their country’s future. I believe that the country is in a strong position to continue progressing in its own development and make a positive contribution to the development of Southeast Asia. Timor-Leste deserves ASEAN support for its efforts to further integrate and engage with the wider region.

After regaining independence from Indonesia in 2002, Timor-Leste declared its desire to join ASEAN and applied for membership in 2011. While its ultimate accession is likely, there is a chance that the delays that have arisen over the past six years may persist indefinitely. Such a development would not only deprive the Timorese of a chance for further development; ASEAN would forgo an opportunity to welcome a country that can serve as a valuable example of a successful democracy to fellow members.

Over the past 15 years, Timor-Leste has grown into a well-functioning democracy where citizens actively engage with their government. The country was ranked as the most democratic in Southeast Asia by the Economist Intelligence Unit’s 2016 Democracy Index, and 43rd in the world—an impressive feat given the country’s traumatic experience during the 24-year Indonesian occupation.

One of the important ways Timor-Leste has been able to deliver sustainable democratic reforms has been through its openness to regional and international support. To this end, organizations like IRI have worked with civil society, government bodies and political parties to help them represent Timorese citizens responsively and effectively. IRI has worked in the country since 2002, and its assistance has been an important contributor to the country’s democratic consolidation.

Likewise, when I served as the U.S. ambassador to the Asian Development Bank and traveled to Timor-Leste in years past, I saw the importance of regional and international economic assistance to this and other developing countries first-hand. The ADB has supported infrastructure expansion, macroeconomic capacity-building and community-based development in Timor-Leste, and is well-positioned to assist not just in improving the country’s roads, but also its water supply and sanitation systems. I grew to appreciate the complementary nature of different types of development assistance, and found that the aid provided by the ADB complements the assistance provided by groups like IRI, and vice-versa.

As ASEAN continues to grow in importance, it is vital that its members collectively pursue policies that advance the region’s development in a sustainable manner. At a time when democracy is backsliding in the region, Timor-Leste’s accession to ASEAN would provide the region with a valuable example of how citizen-centered democracy can deliver a more prosperous and stable future.

Additionally, Timor-Leste’s accession to ASEAN would be economically beneficial to the region. Despite its small size, Timor represents a relatively untapped market for Southeast Asian trade; likewise, the region represents a largely untapped market for Timorese goods. In short, this would be a win-win situation for the region, and an important example for how inclusive economic development can sustain growth that benefits all.

During the lead-up to the election, election administrators, political parties and other stakeholders worked collaboratively to ensure a credible electoral process. This commitment to the rule of law and democratic institutions bodes extremely well for Timor-Leste’s potential as a cooperative and responsible member of ASEAN. My experience travelling through this small yet vibrant nation has driven home the benefits for all of proceeding with Timor-Leste’s accession.

Now is a time for coming together. We owe no less to the many people who across Asia’s newest nation proudly held up an indelibly-inked finger as a mark and proof of democracy in action.

The Good, the Bad and the NAFTA

July 19, 2017

Antonio O. Garza (U.S. Ambassador to Mexico, 2002-2009)

Cross posted from Ambassador Garza’s website

—–

Over the past few weeks, there has been some great news coming out of Mexico’s energy sector.

First, there was the announcement that a consortium of international energy companies had discovered enormous shallow water oil reserves in a previously unexplored bloc. These companies won the rights to explore the field two years ago during the energy reform’s first public bidding round, and it now appears that their risk will be paid off with an abundance of black gold. Yet, it’s not just the companies that will benefit, it’s a boost for the energy reform writ large and also for the Mexican government’s tax coffers (as they are set to rake in 83 percent in taxes over the project’s lifetime). This past week, I also met with U.S. Secretary of Energy Rick Perry while he was in Mexico City to highlight our strong and vitally important cross-border energy integration. As other parts of the bilateral relationship are looking tense, this is one area where the two countries are moving ever closer together.

Yet, there is still a fair share of bad news coming out of Mexico and in some cases it’s getting worse. The country’s murder rate has skyrocketed this year, with 11,155 people killed from January through May alone (a 32 percent increase from last year), including seven journalists. Corruption allegations have also shown no signs of abating. Over the past year, the federal government took the positive step of indicting several corrupt governors, but so far there have been few steps toward seriously prosecuting them or rewriting the rules to make sure that others can’t follow in their illicit footsteps. Public frustration over this combination of ineffectiveness and inaction came to a boil when the Mexican government was accused of using top-secret technology to spy on not just organized criminal groups but also public intellectuals, journalists, and human rights investigators.

Finally, there is one news item that can only be categorized by its profound uncertainty: the NAFTA renegotiations. These discussions are scheduled to begin in early fall, after the United States wraps up its 90-day notification period (it has already collected more than 12,000 public comments and held three days of public hearings). On Monday, the U.S. government published its “Summary of Objectives for the NAFTA Renegotiation,” which covers broad swaths of North America’s $1 trillion in cross-border trade. But the negotiators will have to move fast, as they’ll be under intense pressure to wrap up discussions by early 2018, before Mexico’s presidential campaigns pick up steam.

To follow all the latest bilateral and trilateral developments, The Mexican Council on Foreign Relations, COMEXI and the Bush Center are doing an excellent job at creating smart North America focused content. In a recent report, COMEXI lays out various recommendations for “Redefining the Bilateral Relationship,” across the NAFTA negotiations, bilateral security, the border, and migration—highlighting not just policy divergences but the many areas where the United States and Mexico’s interests align. Meanwhile, the Bush Institute’s North American Competitiveness Initiative continues to be an excellent resource for in-depth context and recommendations on boosting our region’s prosperity and security.

Art and meaning and ties between cultures – 140 Twitter characters will only get us so far

July 18, 2017

Nancy Brinker (U.S. Ambassador to Hungary, 2001-2003; U.S. Chief of Protocol, 2007-2009)

Cross posted from Fox News Opinion

—–

Inside the ever-evolving world of communications it is clear that technology sits at the center of our conversations. Never before has it been so easy to share information with someone anywhere at anytime. But just because we are talking to someone, doesn’t mean we are talking with them. It’s this challenge that sits at the heart of an ever-widening divide between America and the rest of the world.

A recent international survey spearheaded by the Pew Research Center found that favorable ratings of the United States have decreased from 64 percent of people across all countries surveyed in 2016 to 49 percent this spring. The decline in regard for how much foreign nations hold America is especially pronounced among some of our closest allies in Europe and Asia, as well as neighboring Mexico and Canada. Those looking for an answer to rectify this crisis of confidence in American leadership, would be wise to look to the words of American educator Steven Covey, who said we must “seek to understand before you can be understood.”

In 1963, President Kennedy founded the “Arts in the Embassies” program, a public-private partnership between the U.S. State Department and more than 20,000 partners from museums, galleries, collectors and others that enable thousands of artists to show their art at U.S. embassies abroad. Every president and secretary of state has embraced this program since. The universal language of art has become an important part of American foreign policy and continues to play a leading role in strengthening ties between nations.

On September 11, 2001, shortly after being confirmed by the U.S. Senate to serve as America’s Ambassador to the Republic of Hungary, I was on my way to the airport to board a flight for Budapest when the planes hit the World Trade Center and Pentagon. The car was turned around. That day my travel itinerary changed along with the norms that had come to define U.S. foreign policy for generations.

After my arrival in the Hungarian capital we set to work on establishing ties between our two nations. Enhanced security and safety concerns resulted in delayed approval to acquire American art. So instead of waiting to decorate the residence with American art, artists from Budapest were invited to loan their art to adorn the walls. That gesture, which sought to personify a communicative bond and respect for culture between two peoples, went a long way toward gaining the appreciation of the Hungarian government.

The artwork, which encapsulates creativity in the face of duress, allowed me to better understand the unique history of the Hungarian people. Together, our progress included newfound cooperation with security initiatives in the Global War on Terror; resolved commerce transparency issues; and the establishment of the first conference on human trafficking and the exploitation of workers, which was attended by neighboring Balkan States.

My return to the United States in 2003 and subsequent posting as the Chief of Protocol for the White House offered the opportunity to welcome foreign heads of state and educate a wide audience on Hungarian art. The collection, which is shared with my son Eric, spans more than 150 years, from just before the Austro-Hungarian Empire to the present. One of the largest collections outside of Hungary, it includes the works of the acknowledged masters of modernism, as well as artists of more modest reputations who never would have gotten the recognition they deserve if we had not been able to share their works with American universities and museums that have featured our collection.

In this time of complex communication and diminished respect for American ideals among our allies, 140 Twitter characters will only get us so far. My experience as an ambassador bears this eternal lesson: if you want to know a people, you need to take the time to learn about who they are and where they came from, their hopes and aspirations, their art and culture.

What Are the Opportunities for ASEAN?

July 14, 2017

Curtis Chin (U.S. Ambassador to the Asian Development Bank, 2007-2010; Asia Fellow, Milken Institute)

Cross posted from Yale Insights

Asia’s importance in the world economy is large and growing; the continent already accounts for one third of global GDP, according to the World Bank. While the giant economies of China and India get the most attention, the countries of Southeast Asia are contributing to that growth as well. PwC’s Long View forecast sees Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia moving into the world’s 25 biggest economies, with Indonesia rising to number four globally, by 2050.

Those countries, plus Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Singapore, are part of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), which gives them collective economic and political heft. The Council on Foreign Relations describes ASEAN as the most developed example of regional integration outside of the EU. (That isn’t to say the two unions are easily comparable. EU members share sovereignty through a strong, legally-based, central institution, while ASEAN is a consensus-based intergovernmental agency with no element of sovereignty sharing.)

In addition to providing some measure of economic integration, ASEAN provides much-needed stability to a region that was the site of war and genocide for much of the late 20th century. But that doesn’t mean that Western-style democracy is taking hold. Earlier this year, Phil Robertson, deputy director of Human Rights Watch’s Asia division, told Agence France Presse, “Human rights is in a precipitous downward spiral in every ASEAN country except perhaps Myanmar, and that’s only because military rule in that country was so horrible for so long.”

To understand the economic opportunities and development challenges facing the region, Yale Insights talked with Curtis Chin ’90, former U.S. ambassador to the Asian Development Bank and currently an Asia fellow at the Milken Institute.

Q: Can you put ASEAN in context, in Asia and the world?

When people talk about Asia, too often, they’re really just discussing China and India. Clearly those are two giant and very important countries, but there’s more to the region. Put together, the 10 nations of ASEAN have a population of 630 million people. That’s not the billion-plus population of China or India, but it’s very clearly significant. If it were a single economy, ASEAN, at $2.4 trillion, would be just the third largest in Asia. On the other hand, it would be the fifth largest in the world.

The $274 billion invested from the U.S. into ASEAN in 2015 is more than went to China, India, Japan, and South Korea combined. That may be surprising, but I think it’s testament to the tremendous opportunity that ASEAN offers whether as a production base, a market to sell services and products, or as a source of ideas and innovation for the rest of the world.

Q: What are the opportunities and challenges the ASEAN countries face?

It’s important to recognize that Southeast Asia is tremendously diverse. ASEAN includes the city-state of Singapore with its modern infrastructure, population of 5 million people, and role as a hub for financial innovation. It also includes the archipelago nations of the Philippines and Indonesia with populations of 100 million and 250 million, respectively, each spread over thousands of islands. And it includes Myanmar, which is very much finding its way forward in terms of governance and stability. The rules, laws, and structures you need to put in place to attract investment are still being developed. The other countries—Malaysia, Brunei, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos—all have their own unique concerns and different levels of economic development. Leading each of these countries presents very distinct challenges.

Q: As an association of countries, how does ASEAN compare to the EU?

There’s been a lot of compare and contrast between Southeast Asia and what is going on in Europe. Critics will say the consensus-based ASEAN way is slow. The organization has existed for 50 years but only in 2015 did the countries come together to create the ASEAN Economic Community, or AEC.

The AEC is bringing down trade barriers and moving towards, not a European-style common market, but a distinctly Southeast Asian one. The AEC doesn’t mean free trade and free movement of labor, but it has meant freer trade and freer movement of labor. They haven’t moved towards a single currency, and looking at what’s happened in Europe, I don’t think that’s going to happen anytime soon in Southeast Asia. But ASEAN is still coming together, albeit slowly, step by step while the EU is facing Brexit and questions about its future.

To its great credit, Europe has come together in a way that has meant peace for seven decades. Southeast Asia, too, was a region torn by war, and ASEAN has been a tool to bring these diverse nations together in a peaceful manner to slowly build a stronger economy for them all.

Q: Are there specific examples of cooperation that you’d point to?

Examples of greater cooperation and integration would include ASEAN working to address human trafficking and the illegal wildlife trade. More needs to be done, but they are making progress. Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore are coming together to address the challenges of slash-and-burn forest fires that take place every year—pollution knows no borders. As an outsider—although I live in ASEAN—I want them to do more, but they are taking steps forward. It is very important that institutions get stronger, and that individual governments and companies figure out ways to better work together.

When I was the U.S. ambassador to the Asian Development Bank, many people thought that the BRIC countries [Brazil, Russia, India, and China] would really drive the next phase of global growth. In the last couple years, those economies have not grown as fast as people once envisioned. Now, when people ask me whether the next global star will come from Southeast Asia, I say that any of them could take off, but to get there they need to focus first on what I call the “little BRIC”: bureaucracy, regulation, interventionism by government, and corruption.

Clearly, government structures and regulation are necessary, but when does it go too far and reduce the incentives to start a company or hire more people? When is there too much government interventionism in an economy? When is corruption out of hand? For me, the little BRIC is the true economic constraint on growth in Southeast Asia, in ASEAN, and the world.

Q: Are there examples of countries that have found good ways to address some elements of the little BRIC?

The right balance will likely vary country to country and might change over time. As an American, I might think Singapore has too much regulation, but clearly Singapore is doing well and I know the leaders are also thinking through how to encourage more innovation and how to move to a next level of development.

And in terms of corruption, Singapore is among the 10 least corrupt countries on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. The U.S.is only in the top 20. Unfortunately, for a number of ASEAN countries, corruption is an area where there is tremendous need to improve.

Q: In addition to the AEC, there are a number of trade deals that do or may involve ASEAN, including the TPP and RCEP. What’s happening with trade in the region?

China is central to that question. How does China deal with the rest of Asia, and how does the rest of Asia deal with China? That’s critical both economically and militarily, especially with tensions in the South China Sea.

When I think of the alphabet soup of trade deals or potential trade deals, overall integration is a wonderful thing. But we also have to recognize that the consequences of trade have not been equally distributed. Thus the pushback in Europe in the United States, and also in Asia. As we develop trade deals moving forward, countries and companies will need to think through how their citizens or employees will benefit, and if they are going to be hurt by a trade deal, what needs to be done to address that.

If we’re going to have greater free trade, if we’re going to have greater fair trade, more needs to be done to communicate the pluses and minuses of each deal. That will let people make an informed decision, whether it’s the right way to go, or not. And we need to figure out what will ensure that prosperity goes beyond a very small group of people.

Q: What is happening with the digital economy in ASEAN?

When people think of ASEAN, they often think about it as a source of natural resources—the tremendous oil and gas reserves in part of the region—or they’re thinking about ASEAN as production-based: the value of the labor of the people of the Philippines, Indonesia, or Thailand. But ASEAN today shouldn’t be thought of only in those terms. ASEAN today should be looked at as an opportunity even in areas like high-tech and the digital economy.

I saw an interesting statistic, which was that even though ASEAN might only have 630 million people, there are 700 million digital consumers. Clearly many individuals are using multiple devices, but it shows ASEAN’s digital economy is growing in leaps and bounds and will continue to do so. That sector is projected to grow 500%, to $200 billion, by 2025.

Q: What about infrastructure?

There is still tremendous need in areas like power, water, sanitation, and roads throughout much of the region. By one estimate the need is more than $22 trillion through 2030, but there is a significant infrastructure financing gap.

Beyond simply finding the funding, I think that approach needs to be refocused. Too often, development is simply about building. We need to also think through how we maintain and update what is being built.

When I sat on the Asian Development Bank’s board, I became, some would say notorious—I would like to say helpful—in underscoring what I called the three Ps of responsible development. That is, people, planet, and partnership. Responsible development takes into consideration the people that are being impacted by a project, the impact on the broader environment, and the reality that there isn’t enough capital at the ADB, World Bank, or even now the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. The reality is that for the region to move forward, these countries need to encourage their private sectors.

At the end of the day, Asia’s way forward must include a thriving private sector in each country because government cannot be the driver of job creation. Even in China, we’ve seen the government thinking through how they can use the private sector to move their economy forward, to increase growth. There just isn’t enough money to build an economy on state-owned enterprises.

Q: How does that dovetail with your work as the inaugural Asia Fellow at the Milken Institute?

The Milken Institute is a nonprofit, nonpartisan economic and policy think tank that focuses on increasing prosperity. These are questions that are very much on the minds of the leaders of Southeast Asia: “How do we get economies to move forward? How do we get there to be more growth and more evenly spread growth?”

For the Milken Institute, capital market development is key. Without capital to allow for implementation, even the best idea remains simply an idea. What’s critical for the countries of ASEAN is that they need to bring together their own private sectors, public sectors, and civil societies to develop strategies to increase access to capital. As the nations of Asia-Pacific address this little BRIC, foreign direct investment is more likely to come in, which will drive job creation.

And today there are many different ways that countries and companies can access capital. It’s no longer a loan to the government from the World Bank or a business loan from a local bank. There are lessons from the United States, from Europe, and from around the world that I think countries of ASEAN will increasingly want to adopt.

America’s Hostage Negotiation Strategy is Broken

June 26, 2017

Bill Richardson (Governor of New Mexico, 2003-2011; Secretary of Energy, 1998-2000; U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, 1997-1998; U.S. Congressman from New Mexico, 1982-1996)

Cross posted from The Washington Post.

___

Otto Warmbier was laid to rest June 22 by his loving family in their town outside of Cincinnati, nine days after he was brought home in a coma after 17 months of imprisonment in North Korea. The North Korean government described him as a prisoner of war, so by their own definition, his death is their absolute responsibility, pursuant to the Geneva Conventions. That the North Korean government kept him in an unresponsive state without proper medical assistance constitutes a crime in terms of international law and flouts common decency.

The blame is theirs. The lesson for us is that America’s hostage negotiation strategy is broken.

I’ve helped rescue hostages from around the world and from North Korea, specifically. In 1994, I negotiated the return of downed Army helicopter pilot from North Korea and the remains of his co-pilot. In 1996, I helped bring American Evan Hunziker back from North Korea. I, and the team at my center, worked for 15 months to try to gain Otto’s release, including a visit to Pyongyang in September.

To bring these cases to a resolution, we often work on three parallel tracks: identifying opportunities to create leverage; engaging directly with captors to ascertain what it might take to secure hostages’ release; and working with the families of those taken hostage, who often find themselves in need of guidance. Working on all three tracks remains viable, but Otto’s case shows that it’s time for a paradigm shift.

First, we have to recognize that time is no longer neutral. In past instances, all that mattered was working toward an outcome, no matter how long it might take. But urgency must be the new norm if we’re to have a chance at curtailing the physical and mental abuse that prisoners can face, particularly when dealing with unpredictable actor. In the year-plus since Otto was detained, Kim Jong Un contravened a litany of humanitarian norms regarding treatment of hostages. The regime still hasn’t provided a believable explanation for Otto’s coma, and why they failed to disclose his condition to the family or diplomatic proxies in the country.

But timing is only part of the problem. Previous hostage negotiations have had success largely because outside actors have been effective in pressuring their client states. Maybe North Korea doesn’t have an incentive to appease America, but China, which works with both countries and fears the collapse of the North Korean state, does. Otto’s case, though, underscores the reality that the final stages of negotiations between sovereign states often need to be undertaken by the parties themselves — here, the governments of the United States and North Korea.

Yet despite the clear need for governments to resolve these cases bilaterally, the U.S. has no clear policy on how to handle instances in which Americans are held as collateral by foreign governments. It’s not that the U.S. hasn’t tried to improve its overall approach. In the final years of his administration, President Barack Obama made a concerted effort to rethink how the government treats hostage cases, primarily in circumstances where Americans are held by terrorist organizations. The creation of the Hostage Recovery Fusion Cell was a step in the right direction. It’s meant to encourage agencies and departments to share relevant information among all participating actors in securing the release of prisoners held by terrorist groups, and exists to provide channels to keep families informed on the progress of their relatives’ cases.

But that’s not enough. Families who have engaged with the HRFC have expressed frustration at the lack of information-sharing — something the HRFC was ultimately supposed to fix. Other families who have hired private external negotiators have been stymied by strict rules regarding the sharing of information with outside parties working to create the conditions necessary for a deal to be reached.

Yet we know coordinated private diplomacy is often critical. Unconstrained by traditional diplomatic choreography, private diplomacy leverages preexisting personal relations and trust that can lead to the sharing of information and creative flexibility, something with which government struggles. To try to bring Otto home, for example, representatives from my center met more than 20 times with North Korean officials. The information gathered was critical. Coordinating and sharing these efforts between government and private diplomacy can unleash a set of tools largely ignored, and in some cases eschewed, to date. For example, a small gesture of recognition — a note delivered privately — from the United States indicating that it would see Otto’s release as a humanitarian gesture, could have helped bring him home earlier: private diplomacy working hand-in-hand with government.

Yet for all the shortcomings of U.S. hostage policy, President Trump has yielded one clear success with the release of Aya Hijazi, who was held by the Egyptian government until shortly after the president’s White House meeting with Egypt’s President Abdel-Fattah el-Sissi. Trump deserves credit here, but his administration can’t rely on this sort of leader-to-leader diplomacy as a primary approach, as it would incentivize governments to take Americans captive, not to mention forcing the president to shift focus from important geostrategic issues.

To secure the release of the other three U.S. citizens being held in North Korea, Joshua Holt in Venezuela, Siamak Namazi in Iran and Austin Tice in Syria, to name a few, the administration must first treat these cases with urgency rather than patience, and second, convene a contact group, including private diplomacy actors across the political and private spectrums, to identify case-by-case strategies and levers. Personal relations are assets and they do not exclusively lie inside one administration.

Time to Negotiate with North Korea

June 23, 2017

Thomas Graham, Jr. (Special Representative of the President for Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament, 1994-1997)

Cross posted from the June 23, 2017 edition of U.S. News and World Report

—–

The great Cold Warrior and international negotiator Ambassador Paul Nitze once said to me “Whenever I enter one of these negotiations (U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms negotiations) I try to imagine the narrow strip where both sides can stand comfortably. Then I try to steer U.S. policy toward that place.” That is a good construct for important and sensitive negotiation with an adversary. And it could work with North Korea as well. Whatever one thinks of North Korea, with their horrible record of human rights and disregard for human life, they do have interests, which they acknowledge, and they will negotiate if approached correctly and very carefully.

North Korea, officially the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, is a dangerous state with a long track record of being willing to sell anything to anyone for its own benefit, and a history of state terrorism against South Korea. As such, it poses a double danger. First, the DPRK could sell nuclear weapons to Iran or to terrorist organizations, or it could transfer bomb production technology as it did to Syria during 2005-2007. Second, a nuclear-armed North Korea, with ballistic missiles currently capable of reaching targets throughout Northeast Asia and likely capable of reaching the United States within a few years, is a grave threat to South Korea, Japan and America.

However, Pyongyang’s policy over the years has also included a certain realpolitik and willingness to negotiate. The North Korean regime, which has few allies in the international sphere and grapples with crippling domestic problems, is above all interested in survival, economic benefits and a diplomatic relationship with the United States. Military action against North Korea is not an attractive option; the huge North Korean artillery and rocket forces amassed along the Korean Demilitarized Zone pose a serious threat to Seoul that is less than twenty miles away; and in recent years, uncertainty has developed about what the DPRK might do with its nuclear weapons. Diplomacy is the only practical option.

Some say that the North Koreans are irrational but the track record does not necessarily bear this out. The United States utterly crushed North Korea during the Korean War but 64 years have passed since the end of that conflict, and the Kim family remains in control. The North Koreans have a weak hand and they have played it with skill. Their objectives have always been clear: survival, economic benefits and a relationship with the United States. In the past, to the extent the U.S. was prepared to pay this price, agreement with the DPRK was possible. Playing on this the Clinton administration made real progress: the DPRK nuclear program was essentially shut down – not eliminated but shut down – and an agreement ending their ballistic missile program was close.

For its own purposes, the Bush administration decided to abandon all the Clinton progress, adopt a confrontational position toward North Korea and include North Korea in the president’s axis of evil speech in early 2002. Later that year, just before North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, a U.S. delegation was in Pyongyang. There, among others, the U.S. delegation met with First Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kang Sok-ju who accused the United States of singling out North Korea for nuclear attack and, among other memorable statements, said “We are part of the axis of evil, and you are gentlemen. That is our relationship. We cannot discuss matters like gentlemen. If we disarm ourselves because of U.S. pressure, then we will become like Yugoslavia or Afghanistan’s Taliban to be beaten to death.”

The hardline was back. Over the next 15 years arms limitation was largely abandoned. North Korea conducted five nuclear weapon tests and many ballistic missile tests. The DPRK has become a direct threat to the United States. And the new ruler of North Korea, Kim Jong-un, had raised the stakes. Arguably, negotiation is still possible but now in addition to survival, economic benefits and a relationship with the United States, the DPRK wants to be recognized as a nuclear weapon state, something the United States cannot and should not do.

However, if catastrophe at least at some level is to be avoided, negotiations have to be attempted. The North Koreans likely will be open to making an agreement that they perceive to be in their interest. The trick will be to find the terms of such an agreement that would also be in the interest of the United States. The alternatives are not attractive. Leon Sigal, a long-time, non-government expert on North Korea has suggested an approach of seeking a temporary suspension of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program while both sides discuss reciprocal steps that the U.S. could consider in order to address North Korea’s security concerns. There may be interest in this in North Korea. This could be a place to start.